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Prisoner Exposure to a Pandemic:
Measuring When Institutional
Response Rises to Punishment*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution prohibits the cruel and unusual punishment of
inmates and detainees.1 Accordingly, when prison conditions fall below a
humane level due to acts or omissions by prison officials, the prison may
be found in violation of the Eighth Amendment,2 the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, against an inmate or the Fourteenth Amendment,3
the Due Process Clause, against a pre-trial detainee (hereinafter
detainee).4
Specifically, the assertion of such claims regarding poor prison
conditions raises the question of how prisons, and thus the courts, are
approaching the novel health risks and administrative challenges posed
by a global Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in which the virus is
causing contagion, sickness, and unfortunately death.
Consequently, due to the extraordinary circumstances of COVID-19,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was placed
“at the crossroads of public health and public safety, science and law, and
constitutional and carceral demands”5 when presented with such an
issue as described above. In Swain v. Junior,6 the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the Miami Metro West Detention Center’s (hereinafter
Metro West) response to COVID-19 likely did not violate detainee
* I would like to thank my Casenote advisor, Professor Margaret McCann for her above
and beyond support and assistance throughout the writing process. From Professor
McCann being my first-year professor in Legal Process to my Casenote advisor, Professor
McCann has truly been an integral part of my legal writing development.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (pertaining to inmates); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(pertaining to pre-trial detainees).
5 Swain v. Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
6 961 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2020).
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appellees’ Fourteenth or Eight Amendment constitutional rights even
though Metro West was unable to ensure adequate social distancing and
had seen increased rate of COVID-19 infections.7
Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that given the CDC guidelines for
correctional and detention facilities,8 Metro West’s obligation was only to
respond reasonably to such guidelines.9 In using such a standard, the
court determined that Metro West should not be faulted for guidelines
which were concluded to be impossible to implement or if the harm
caused by the virus was ultimately not averted.10 Thus, just because a
prison’s actions were ineffective at preventing the spread of COVID-19,
does not mean that the prison was “deliberately indifferent” to the health
and safety of its inmate/detainee population, rising to the level of a cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.11
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In late March 2020, Metro West began implementing health and safety
measures to protect inmates against COVID-19, including cancelling
inmate visitation, screening inmates and staff, and advising staff of
sanitation practices.12 After the CDC introduced its guidelines for
correctional facilities on March 23, 2020, Metro West altered its practices
to reflect the guidelines by implementing, among other things, daily
temperature screenings, social distancing efforts, a social hygiene
campaign, and mask mandates.13
Plaintiffs Anthony Swain, Alen Blanco, Bayardo Cruz, Ronniel Flores,
Deondre Willis, Peter Bernal and Winfred Hill were all pre-trial,
medically vulnerable defendants being held at Metro West in Miami,
Florida.14 Prior to the commencing of the Plaintiffs action, no inmate had
tested positive for COVID-19 at Metro West.15

Junior, 961 F.3d at 1286–87.
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Division of
Viral Diseases, Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
in Correctional and Detention Facilities, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(updated
July
22,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-corr
ectional-detention.html.
9 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1286–87.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir. 2020).
13 Swain, 958 F.3d at 1085–86.
14 Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 1291; Junior, 961 F.3d at 1280.
15 Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 1293.
7
8
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Plaintiffs, on April 5, 2020, brought a class action lawsuit against
Miami-Dade County and Daniel Junior in his official capacity as the
Director of the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Center.16 The
complaint alleged that the Defendants had violated Plaintiffs’ Eight
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,17 arguing that "[d]efendants [were] deliberately
indifferent to the risk that [p]laintiffs [would] contract COVID-19 within
the current conditions of Metro West.”18
Then, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida “granted in part [p]laintiffs’ emergency motion and entered a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Defendants on April 7,
2020.”19 As part of the order, and subsequent orders, the Defendants were
required to provide descriptions of the measures currently employed to
protect the individuals being housed at Metro West from the risk of
COVID-19.20 Further, the order named two doctors who were to conduct
an inspection of Metro West and its efforts, and present their findings
back to the court.21 After the inspections were conducted, both doctors
concluded that an urgent reduction in prison population and increased
COVID-19 screenings were necessary to reduce the spread of the virus
within Metro West.22 Additionally, both doctors noted the impossibility
of adhering to CDC guidelines for social distancing measures, including
maintaining six feet of distance between inmates, due to the
dormitory-style housing units.23
By April 28, 2020, a total of 163 inmates at Metro West tested positive
for COVID-19.24 One day later, the district court granted plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to take a
series of preventative actions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 at
Metro West.25 In granting the preliminary injunction, the court found

Id. at 1291.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2020).
18 Junior, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 1291.
19 The court held three telephonic conferences with both parties over a two-day period
following the case being filed. Id. at 1292.
20 Id. Defendants represent that they are mandating that staff and inmates wear
protective coverings at all times, encouraging social distancing by all inmates and staff,
conducting daily temperature/health screening for inmates and staff, disallowing outside
visitation, and providing cleaning and hygiene supplies to inmates. Id. at 1301.
21 Id. at 1292.
22 Id. at 1294.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1293.
25 The court enjoined the defendants to comply with a series of COVID-19 protective
safety measuring including, in pertinent part, to (1) provide and enforce, to the maximum
16
17
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that plaintiffs had shown (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of their § 1983 claim; (2) that they will suffer irreparable harm
absent an injunction; (3) that the threatened injury posed by the
COVID-19 outbreak at Metro West outweighs any damage to the
defendants resulting from an injunction; and (4) that the injunction will
not be adverse to the public interest.26
On the first prong, the court rested its opinion on the belief that the
plaintiffs satisfied both the objective and subjective components of the
Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” analysis.27 The court found
the objective component easily satisfied as a result of a deadly virus
currently spreading among inmates and staff at Metro West a portion of
which have a legitimate medical need to be protected from the virus.28
Pertaining to the subjective component, despite defendants’ assurances
as to the steps taken at Metro West to reduce the spread of COVID-19,
the court found the record to not unequivocally demonstrate successful
implementation of such policies and procedures.29 This finding was based
on evidence provided by the plaintiffs, which indicated that social
distancing was not possible, social distancing was not uniformly enforced,
and inmates lacked access to cleaning supplies and masks.30
Additionally, with the significant increase in infected inmates since the
start of litigation, the court could not accept the defendants’ continued
contentions that their efforts were sufficient to reduce the spread of the
virus.31
After the district court granted the preliminary injunction, the
defendants filed a motion for stay the preliminary injunction pending
appeal.32 The Eleventh Circuit subsequently granted defendants’
motion.33 The Eleventh Circuit, in addressing the likelihood of success on
extent possible, adequate six feet social distancing; (2) communicate COVID-19 information
to all people incarcerated at Metro West; (3) provide all inmates with face masks at
medically appropriate intervals; (4) ensure that all inmates receive individual supplies of
soap, disinfecting products, towels, and toilet paper; (5) provide the district court with
weekly data as to the number of inmates and staff who tested positive for COVID-19 and
current population numbers at Metro West; and (6) provide a proposal outlining defendants
plan to ensure adequate social distancing at Metro West. Id. at 1317–18.
26 Id. at 1309–1314. (holding the four elements required for a preliminary injunction
satisfied).
27 Id. at 1312.
28 Id. at 1311.
29 Id. at 1312.
30 Id. at 1299–300, 1310–11 (conflicting evidence presented by plaintiffs and
defendants).
31 Id. at 1312.
32 Swain, 958 F.3d at 1085.
33 Id.
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appeal, determined that the district court committed error by “incorrectly
collaps[ing] the subjective and objective components” of the deliberate
indifference standard.34 Specifically, the court reasoned that the district
court misapplied the subjective component by “treat[ing] the increase in
COVID-19 infections as proof that the defendants deliberately
disregarded an intolerable risk.”35 Rather, the court of appeals stated
that the harm, COVID-19 infections, that results does not, in and of itself,
provide sufficient evidence of a culpable state of mind.36
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of the
preliminary injunction.37 The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits of their
deliberate indifference claim, specifically the subjective component, in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.38
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Amendments Applicable to Prison Conditions
The Eighth Amendment provides protection from cruel and unusual
punishment, while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “any State
[from] depriv[ing] any person of life liberty, or property, without the due
process of the law.”39 It has been understood that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause protects the rights of citizens, including
detainees, who have not been convicted of crimes, while the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies only to
sentenced criminals.40 However, detainees, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, are entitled to “at least as great” of protection as given to
inmates under the Eighth Amendment.41
A detainee or convicted inmate alleging a violation of their Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights would likely bring a claim under 42
Id. at 1089.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1280. A preliminary injunction is a pre-trial remedy given to a
plaintiff to prevent possible harm which is almost certain to occur absent the court
requiring the defendant to perform or abstain from some action. Sheppard, The Wolters
Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary Desk Edition (2012). Due to the profound effects a
preliminary injunction may have on a defendant prior to a final court ruling, it should be
considered “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as a right.” Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
38 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1289, 1294.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
40 Bailey v. Andrews, 811 F.2d 366, 373 (7th Cir. 1987).
41 Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003).
34
35
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U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is a form of redress when persons, under the
color of state authority, violate an individual’s rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the constitution.42 When an inmate, in prisoncondition cases, alleges an Eighth Amendment violation, a court
evaluates the claim under a deliberate indifference standard.43 Courts
apply this same standard to detainees claiming Fourteenth Amendment
violations due to the notion that “[F]ourteenth [A]mendment rights of
detainees can be defined by reference to the [E]ighth [A]mendment rights
of convicted inmates.”44
B. A Deliberate Indifference Claim
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must provide humane
conditions of confinement by “ensur[ing] that inmates receive adequate
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” and by “tak[ing] reasonable
measures to guarantee the [health and] safety of inmates.”45 The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that both an objective and
subjective requirement must be met when determining if prison officials
have violated an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights.46
1. Objective Requirement
In meeting the first requirement, the plaintiff must show that the
deprivation alleged is objectively, "sufficiently serious.”47 Specifically,
“[f]or a claim . . . based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must
show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm.”48
Further, in determining if conditions present an objectively
unreasonable risk of harm to inmates, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Helling v. McKinney,49 outlined factors courts should
consider.50 Such factors include the plaintiff showing that he, himself, is
currently exposed to the condition in which the cause of action is based
upon; inquiry into the likelihood that such condition will actually cause
such an injury to health or safety; “scientific and statistical inquiry into

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
44 Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985).
45 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
46 Id. at 834.
47 Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016).
48 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
49 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
50 Id. at 36.
42
43
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the seriousness of the potential harm”; and that the “risk of which the
prisoner complains is not one today’s society chooses to tolerate.”51
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Helling that the plaintiff had stated a valid § 1983
claim based on an alleged violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
right.52 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, prison officials, had
exposed him to high levels of environmental toxic smoke, which posed
“an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.”53 The
allegation was premised on the basis that prison officials assigned the
plaintiff to a cell with another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes
a day.54 While still holding the plaintiff’s cause of action to be valid, the
Supreme Court noted the relevancy that the plaintiff had been moved out
of that cell and into a different prison since the complaint was filed and
the adoption of a smoking policy by Nevada State Prison’s Director prior
to remanding the case back to the court of appeals.55 Thus, with respect
to the objective factor, the Supreme Court demonstrated that lower
courts need to account for “changed circumstances” after a lawsuit is filed
when determining if a plaintiff is still personally and currently exposed
to the condition.56
2. Subjective Requirement
In proving the defendants’ deliberate indifference to a substantial risk
of serious harm, the subjective component, the plaintiff needs to show
that the defendant had “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard for that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere
negligence.”57 In other words, the subjective component is likely met if a
defendant has subjective awareness of an “objectively serious need” and
responds in an objectively insufficient manner.58

Id.
Id. at 35.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 28.
55 Id. at 35–36. (inferring that plaintiff would likely not meet the objective component of
the deliberate indifference standard).
56 See id.
57 Lane, 835 F.3d at 1308 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245
(11th Cir. 2003)).
58 Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,
1245–46 (11th Cir. 2003).
51
52
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a. Subjective Knowledge of a Risk of Serious Harm
The Supreme Court, in Farmer v. Brennan,59 held that for a prison
official to be found liable for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.”60 However, the Court articulated
the irrelevancy of merely parsing the phrase “deliberate indifference” by
specifically breaking down the word “deliberate” to solely mean
“knowledge of a risk.”61 As an alternate to actual knowledge, the Court
emphasized that constructive knowledge of a risk by a prison official is
enough to show subjective knowledge.62 As such, the term deliberate
indifference should not automatically preclude circumstances where a
prison official’s awareness may be presumed due to the obviousness of
the risk.63 Therefore, a prison official may be liable “if the risk was
obvious and a reasonable prison official would have noticed it.”64 It is then
left to the trier of fact to determine whether the risk was obvious enough
that knowledge can be inferred based on circumstantial evidence.65
b. Disregard for That Risk by Conduct That is More Than
Mere Negligence
Courts have routinely struggled to determine the level of culpability
deliberate indifference entails.66 In Estelle v. Gamble,67 the Supreme
Court laid the foundation by reasoning that a punishment, as to whether
it violates the Eighth Amendment, should be judged based on the
evolving standards of decency.68 However, in Whitley v. Albers,69 the
Court determined that an act or omission by an individual may not be
considered a punishment even if below the acceptable standard of
decency.70 With those rulings appearing to set forth conflicting levels of
culpability requirements, the Supreme Court, in Farmer, held that the
culpability requirement will be different depending on the underlying

511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
61 Id. at 840.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 841–42.
65 Id. at 844.
66 Id. at 835.
67 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
68 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
69 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
70 See id. at 319–21.
59
60
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basis of an Eighth Amendment claim.71 The Court further elaborated on
the culpability requirement set forth in Estelle as applied to a claim
challenging the conditions of prison confinement.72
In Estelle, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s alleged
insufficiency of medical treatment should not have survived the
defendant’s motion against the chief medical officer of the prison hospital
to dismiss the claims, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit’s decision.73 The case involved a prisoner claiming a
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly receiving an
inadequate diagnosis and medical treatment for his back.74 However, the
plaintiff had seen the prison’s doctor on seventeen prior occasions and
been treated with bed rest, muscle relaxants, and pain relievers.75 The
Supreme Court determined that the case represented a classic example
of medical judgment in which not ordering an x-ray or other like measure
did not represent cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.76
In making such a ruling, the Court affirmed that the level of
culpability required would be an Eighth Amendment punishment,
“which [is] incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society or which involve the unnecessary
and wonton infliction of pain.”77 As such, the Court noted the clear
difference between a mere inadvertent failure to provide adequate
medical care, and a prison official being deliberately indifferent to a
serious medical need constituting unnecessary and wanton infliction of
paint.78 The former likely does not rise to the level of a punishment in
violation of an inmate’s or detainee’s Eighth Amendment right, while the
latter likely does.79
However, the Supreme Court appeared to heighten the culpability
requirement in Whitley.80 There, a riot situation was underway in which
inmates had secured a prison official as a hostage.81 As prison officials
were making their way upstairs to free the hostage, the officials fired

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36.
Id. at 839–840.
73 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 108.
74 Id. at 98.
75 Id. at 107.
76 Id. at 107–08.
77 Id. at 102.
78 See id. at 104–05.
79 Id. at 104–05.
80 475 U.S. at 320–21.
81 Id. at 314–15.
71
72
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warning shots. One inmate still proceeded up the stairs and was
subsequently shot. That inmate alleged he was deprived of his Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.82
The Supreme Court ruled that the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights
were not violated after determining that the shooting was a good faith
effort to restore prison order.83 The Supreme Court held that in
determining if the shooting of the inmate in a riot situation inflicted
unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering, the question turned to
“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm."84
When an Eighth Amendment claim is not predicated on alleged
physical violence or force, the Supreme Court determined that Estelle
should be the basis of the culpability requirement.85 In Farmer, the Court
reviewed an Eighth Amendment claim in which the plaintiff alleged that
prison officials denied her humane conditions of confinement due to the
prison officials placing her in a male jail cell where she was beaten and
raped.86 In reversing summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the
Supreme Court made clear that the deliberate indifference standard
given in Whitley only applies “when officials [are] accused of using
excessive physical force.”87 In all other situations, such as claims
challenging conditions of confinement or medical care administered, the
claims should be evaluated based on the deliberate indifference standard
given in Estelle.88
In detailing the culpability standard set in Estelle, the Court described
it as “entail[ing] something more than mere negligence, [but can be]
satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of
causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”89 To further
simplify Estelle’s deliberate indifference standard, the Court adopted
“subjective recklessness” as a test for deliberate indifference under the
Eighth Amendment.90
The Court, in giving additional guidance on determining subjective
recklessness, made known that the core of a court’s analysis should focus

Id. at 316–17.
Id. at 325–26.
84 Id. at 320–21.
85 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36.
86 Id. at 829–30.
87 Id. at 835.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 839–40, 114 S. Ct. at 1980.
82
83

2021

PRISONER EXPOSURE TO A PANDEMIC

1441

on whether an official “responded reasonably” to a known and
“substantial risk to inmate health and safety”91 rather than on whether
the harm was ultimately averted or not. Specifically, in suits which seek
injunctive relief to prevent a substantial risk of serious injury from
ripening into actual harm, a court should judge a prison or prison
official’s response, in determining “reasonability” or deliberate
indifference, “in light of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and
conduct”92 and “their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought
and persisting thereafter.”93
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Junior, the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with determining whether
the district court abused its discretion by granting a preliminary
injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, requiring the defendants to comply
with an extensive list of COVID-19 safety measures.94 While there are
four requirements which must be established for a preliminary
injunction to be granted, the Eleventh Circuit, as did the district court,
focused its attention on the likelihood that the plaintiffs will succeed on
the merits of their constitutional claim.95
The court briefly articulated that even though the plaintiffs’ claim
technically arose under the Fourteenth Amendment as the plaintiffs are
both pre-trial detainees, the claim should be evaluated under the
deliberate indifference standard as applied to an Eighth Amendment
claim.96
After establishing that the district court properly chose to apply the
deliberate indifference standard to the plaintiffs’ claim, the court
promptly ruled that the objective component was met.97 This was not a
disputed issue between the parties, as COVID-19, without a doubt, poses
a substantial risk of serious harm towards the plaintiffs.98
The court was then left to determine the likelihood that plaintiffs had
met the subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard. In
order to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
risk of harm posed by COVID-19 towards the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs
must demonstrate that the Defendants had "(1) subjective knowledge of
Id. at 844.
511 U.S. at 845; Helling, 509 U.S. at 27.
93 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845.
94 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1284.
95 Id. at 1285.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
91

92 Farmer,
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a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is
more than mere negligence."99
The court acknowledged, as almost obvious, that the first sub-element,
the defendants’ subjective knowledge of the risk associated with
COVID-19 was met for purposes of granting a preliminary injunction.100
In evaluating the remaining sub-elements, the court applied the
principles described in Farmer.101 Thus, the plaintiffs must prove that
the defendants disregarded the risk posed by COVID-19 through conduct
that was more than mere negligence by showing that the defendants had
a sufficiently culpable state of mind demonstrated by subjective
recklessness.102
Next, the court reiterated the basis for which the district court made
its determination: “(1) the increase in the rate of infections at Metro West
and (2) the lack—and seeming impossibility—of meaningful social
distancing at the facility.”103 The court first concluded that the district
court erred in relying on the increased infection rates because, as
established in Farmer, the court should focus on the reasonableness of
the response rather than whether the harm was averted.104 Therefore, if
the defendants supply evidence tending to show officials acted reasonably
to thwart the risk, the defendants should not be held automatically liable
solely because COVID-19 continued to spread at Metro West.105
Second, the court ruled that the district court erred “in concluding that
the defendants’ inability to ensure adequate social distancing constituted
deliberate indifference.”106 The court based its ruling on the district court
stating repeatedly that social distancing was impossible at Metro West,
the inmates’ own declarations supporting the notion that social
distancing was impossible, and the finding made in the
court-commissioned expert report that it was impossible to follow the
CDC social distancing guidelines at Metro West.107 Taking such evidence
into consideration, the court determined that the defendants “failing to
do the ‘impossible’ doesn’t evince indifference, let alone deliberate
indifference.”108

Id. at 1285 (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1308) (quotation omitted).
Id.
101 Id. at 1285–86.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1287.
104 Id.
105 See id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
99

100
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In conducting its own analysis, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
defendants’ entire course of conduct, taking into account all of
defendants’ evidence, discounting factual disputes regarding the
implementation of defendants’ policies and procedures, and setting aside
factual disputes regarding the different measures that the defendants
allege to have adopted.109 The court took into consideration the
court-commissioned expert report which concluded that defendants did
their best to defendants encourage social distancing by putting tape on
the floor, staggering prison bunks in head to toe configurations, and
staggering and distancing patient inmates when going to receive medical
treatment and testing.110 The court also clarified that the CDC guidelines
for correctional facilities do not require social distancing of six feet
between inmates. Rather, the social distancing provision recommends
maintaining six feet of distance as the “ideal” practice.111 When ideal
social distancing cannot be practiced as recommended, the guidelines
indicate a need for tailoring the correctional facility’s strategies to
individual spaces in a facility, like arranging bunks so individuals sleep
head to toe, and that certain strategies may not be feasible in certain
facilities.112 Moreover, the court reviewed the defendants’ evidence of the
measures taken by the prison to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, such
as requiring face masks be worn by inmates and staff at all times, giving
inmates disinfecting and hygiene supplies, prohibiting outside visitation,
checking inmates temperatures daily, and requiring staff to undergo
screening prior to entering the facility.113
After weighing the experts’ opinions, the interpretation of the CDC
guidelines for correctional facilities, and the defendants’ evidence, the
court determined the defendants should not have their actions be
considered unreasonable or subjectively reckless when the evidence
demonstrates that the prison officials did their best.114 The defendants’
should not have their mitigation efforts discounted merely because the
prison encountered the “perfect storm of a contagious virus and the space
constraints inherent in a correctional facility.”115 With defendants’
mitigation activities considered reasonable, the plaintiffs failed to meet
the subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard.116

Id. at 1287–88.
Id. at 1288.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1288–89.
113 Id. at 1289.
114 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1289; see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40.
115 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1289; see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40.
116 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1289.
109
110
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Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed
on the merits of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
claim and vacated the district court’s grant of plaintiffs’ preliminary
injunction, concluding that the district court abused its discretion in
doing so.117
V. IMPLICATIONS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Junior sets forth clear precedent for lower courts to follow when
dealing with an emergency situation where an inmate or detainee claims
a violation of their Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.118 The new
precedent applies the deliberate indifference subjective component
established in Farmer and relates those principles to an emergency
situation in which the harm is imminent and steps taken to eliminate the
harm, no matter the degree, will not eliminate such harm.119
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Junior highlighted the importance
and scope of the subjective component in a deliberate indifference
analysis as applied to an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim alleged
by an inmate or detainee.120 More specifically, the court implicitly applied
the principle described in Farmer, where the Supreme Court held that
the actions’ “reasonability” or deliberate indifference should be judged “in
light of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and conduct”121 and
“their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting
thereafter.”122 The Eleventh Circuit simplified that notion by asserting
that the focus, in determining whether a defendant exhibited subjective
recklessness, should be on the entirety of the defendant’s conduct and not
on isolated failures or impossibilities.123
Evidence of Metro West prison officials’ isolated failures to prevent
COVID-19 spread and to strictly and uniformly enforce six-foot social
distancing, in plain terms, “bogged” down the district court and
hampered its analysis. However, the Eleventh Circuit was able to
separate “the resultant harm” from the “actions taken by the
defendants.”124 This adjustment, especially when the risks being
presented by the plaintiffs are potentially life threatening, involve a
Id. at 1294.
id. at 1287.
119 See id. at 1287.
120 See id. at 1285–88.
121 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845; see Helling, 509 U.S. 25; see Junior, 961 F.3d at 1287–89.
122 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845; see Junior, 961 F.3d at 1287–89.
123 Junior, 961 F.3d at 1287–88.
124 See id.
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worldwide pandemic, and the risk is considered the largest public health
emergency ever, is crucial in determining whether the defendants’
actions were reasonable or reckless.125 Thus, the resultant harm imposed
upon an inmate or detainee, with no consideration of the actions or
omissions taken by prison officials, cannot constitute an infliction of a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.126
Therefore, even when presented with an emergency situation such as a
deadly virus spreading and infecting inmates, the Eleventh Circuit
clarified that the lower courts in the Eleventh Circuit are not to stray
away from the principles listed in Farmer.127
As the pandemic continues, the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Junior has
already been applied in other COVID-19 related Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claim cases and cases involving petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 for writ of habeas corpus.128 For example, in Dixon v. Ivey,129 the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of conditions at Red Eagle
Honor Farm (Red Eagle), a correctional facility.130 In denying the
plaintiff a preliminary injunction, based on evidence of the extensive
safety measures taken by Red Eagle, the court held that “it is improper
for a court to equate an increased rate of infection with deliberate
indifference.”131
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Swain v. Junior will live
on to shed light on the true job of courts, which is to decide a claim on the
merits and not based on a panicked state caused by an emergency,
whether it be COVID-19, a traumatic event, or the next global problem.

Josh Slovin
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